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Abstract  
This study is concerned with how hybrid partnerships -i.e., multi-party cross-
sector partnerships that deal with broad problems that go beyond the scope and scale 
of single partners- setup, implement and then innovate business models. In particu-
lar, we draw on a hybrid partnership for open innovation where six public and pri-
vate organizations came together with the intention to setup and implement joint 
innovation projects with large scale impact at the regional level. Two business mod-
els of hybrid partnerships are discussed in this chapter, the brokering model and the 
platform model, as well as the mechanisms of transition from the first to the latter. 
Our findings suggest that while the platform model seems more appropriate for 
complex projects in which a wide number of heterogeneous interests coexist, both 
models present advantages and disadvantages. We suggest that attention should be 
given to considering advantages and disadvantages in a relational manner, by fo-
cusing on how the business model innovation will impact on each parameter of the 
current model and, at the same time, on how manageable the parameters of the new 
model are in terms of partnership strategy, structure and mobilizable resources.  
Keywords: hybrid partnerships; cross-sector; broker; business model innovation; 
open innovation 
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1. Introduction  
 
This chapter is concerned with business model innovation in cross-sector col-
laborations for complex innovation projects. Most research in business model inno-
vation has focused on organizations’ ability to create innovation and improvement 
processes in order to build new value propositions or enter new markets and indus-
tries (Massa and Tucci 2013) but less is known about what happens when business 
models need to be set up, assessed and revisited in a collaboration ecosystem with 
multiple private and public organizations, each mobilizing distinct interests, goals 
and objectives. We draw on a longitudinal case study of a hybrid partnership in the 
North of Italy that brought together multiple private and public actors such as the 
local government, a Chamber of Commerce, several industrial and trade associa-
tions, a Public Utility Company and a Regional European Development Office, with 
the goal to support open innovation projects at the regional level. The case study is 
particularly relevant for the Entrepreneurial, Innovative and Sustainable (EIS) eco-
system approach. In particular, it describes the birth and evolution of a local eco-
system focused on innovation, knowledge transfer and sustainability, in which het-
erogeneous organizations constantly stepped in and out of the boundaries of the 
project, according to their own interests and struggled, at the same time, to create 
an adequate business model for the ecosystem, which would have also reflected 
their own interests at hand. The case follows the evolution of a new organization 
called RIO that partners created in support of the partnership and to which they 
delegated the management of the partnership ecosystem. By following the evolution 
of RIO, we were able to trace the evolution of the ecosystem itself, identifying col-
laboration stages, critical turning points and best practices for managing the critical 
points of the partnership. In particular, we discuss three stages in the ecosystem: a 
brokering model stage, a transition stage and a platform model stage, and show how 
multiple adjustments were made from one stage to the next in order to suit more 
closely the nature and dynamics of the ecosystem. Unpacking the assumptions of 
each model, their critical points, the consequences and the coping mechanisms that 
they triggered, allowed us to adopt a practice-based perspective on business model 
innovation in hybrid partnerships. We propose a discussion on ecosystems orga-
nized according to brokering versus platform models. We suggest that a careful 
analysis of the characteristics of the ecosystem can favor the identification of best 
practices for its organization.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. We first discuss the importance of hybrid 
partnerships for open innovation. We then streamline what is known about business 
model innovation at the inter-organizational setting, and highlight a set of critical 
points that still need to be investigated to understand the challenges that setting up 
and modifying a business model at the inter-organizational level entails with respect 
to the organizational level. We then describe the context of the case study, and give 
an account of the main findings which are organized around three stages: the broker 
model stage, the transition stage and the platform model stage. In the discussion 
section, we summarize a series of advantages and disadvantages of the two models, 
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and comment on how they inform best practices about business model innovation 
in the case of hybrid partnerships.  
 
2. Towards an understanding of business model innovation in hybrid partner-
ships 
2.1 – Hybrid partnerships as tools for open innovation 
 
Inter-organizational collaborative activities have become more prominent and 
extensive not just in the private sector but in the public sector as well, with hybrid 
forms of collaborative engagement between business, government, and civil society 
being stipulated every day (Bryson et al. 2006; Hartley et al. 2013; Kivleniece and 
Quelin 2012; Selsky and Parker 2005). Many of these cross-sector collaborations 
are constituted to address metaproblems – broadly defined overarching frames en-
tailing interests that have to do with the public good and go beyond the jurisdiction 
and competencies of single organizations. Examples of metaproblems addressed 
through public-private collaborations are fostering industrial competitiveness, man-
aging urban development, improving social welfare and fostering social innovation, 
or programming the sustainable development of a given region (Linder and Rosenau 
2000; Selsky and Parker 2005).  
 
A case that entails significant challenges is that of cross-sector partnerships for 
collaborative (i.e., open) innovation where public and private organizations get to-
gether with the intention to setup and implement joint innovation projects with large 
scale impact. As far as the public sector is concerned, there has been growing atten-
tion to intrapreneurial and entrepreneurial processes (Damanpour and Schneider 
2009; Leitao and Alves 2016; Morris & Jones 1999). For instance, trends in public 
entrepreneurship are increasingly pushing public actors towards innovation ecosys-
tems that encompass cross-cutting organizations, groups, teams and communities 
(Bernier and Hafsi 2007; Hjorth 2013). Accordingly, not only governments become 
interested in promoting and supporting the innovation of private organizations but 
they also turn into active project stakeholders. Motivations include expanding juris-
diction to new sectors by retrieving skills and competencies that are not available 
internally, achieving legitimation in new markets and fields, or simply adjusting to 
the institutional logics of the New Public Management (Bryson et al. 2006; Skelcher 
2005). Similarly, private organizations that try to enter fields and markets where 
private initiative is viewed with suspicion are increasingly considering long-term 
partnerships with public organizations, governmental institutions or NGOs 
(Googins and Rochlin 2000; Rondinelli and London 2003). By lowering costs, 
reaching new groups of customers, and more broadly filling institutional voids 
through new product or service offerings, open innovation is considered a tool to 
create bundles of social and economic value (Koschmann et al. 2010; Le Ber and 
Branzei 2009; Selsky and Parker 2005). As a consequence, it becomes important to 
understand how organizations engaged in long term cross-sector multi-party part-
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nerships manage to collaborate inside complex innovation projects and, in particu-
lar, how they setup, negotiate, implement and revisit the business model of the part-
nership throughout its lifecycle. 
 
It has been argued that ecosystems that entail heterogeneous partners present 
multiple challenges for those who enact them. For instance, there is evidence that 
although collaboration between cross-sector organizations mobilizes broadly de-
fined objectives as to allow partners’ divergent interests to co-exist, collaborations 
are often permeated by tensions between self versus common interest, especially as 
the number of partners increases (Turcotte and Pasquero 2001; Waddell and Brown 
1997). It is thus important to understand the main advantages and challenges faced 
by public and private organizations that decide to collaborate in complex innovation 
projects. More importantly, it is important to keep track of how the partnership 
evolves through time. The creation of a common ground for collaboration has been 
said to play a fundamental part in partnerships’ ability to adjust through time 
(Majchrzak et al. 2015). Koschmann and colleagues (2010) have argued, for in-
stance, that the overall value of cross-sector partnerships is not merely in connecting 
interested parties but, rather, in their ability to substantially influence the people and 
issues within the domains of the interested parties. This ability, they argue, comes 
from the constitution of organizational forms that are distinct from their members 
and that display collective agency—the capacity to influence a host of relevant out-
comes beyond what individual organizations could do on their own. New structures 
such as functional roles, organizational teams, common projects and common goal 
structures have been found useful for negotiating tensions and fueling partnership 
interaction because they can act as scaffolds for the creation of a common ground 
(Doz and Baburoglu 2000; Le Ber and Branzei 2009). On the one hand, attempts to 
create a common strategy allows actors to draft premises and rules of the game, but 
on the other, given the different interests and logics at stake, it paves the way for 
additional conflicts and misunderstandings that organizations might not be prepared 
for upfront (Selsky and Parker 2005; Turcotte and Pasquero 2001). We thus argue 
that business models, and partners’ ability to setup, negotiate and revise business 
models (i.e., business model innovation) may play a fundamental role in under-
standing, diagnosing and establishing best practices for the evolution of hybrid part-
nerships through time.  
 
 
2.2 – Business model innovation in hybrid interorganizational partnerships 
 
Although no generally accepted definition of the term “business model” has yet 
been reached -for instance, terms such as “business model”, “business strategy” or 
even “economic model” are often used interchangeably (Morris et al. 2005)- busi-
ness models reflect “management’s hypothesis about what customers want, how 
they want it and what they will pay, and how an enterprise can organize to best meet 
customer needs, and get paid well for doing so” (Teece 2010 p.20). In other words, 
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business models offer a holistic approach explaining how firms “do business” en-
compassing basic insights of innovation, business processes and routines 
(Casadesús-Masanell and Ricart 2010; Cavalcante et al. 2011; Zott et al. 2011). A 
good business model is a relatively comprehensive description of the organization’s 
situation, structures and capabilities, the partners, the target market, the value prop-
osition, who is creating and capturing value, the value chain, as well as which ac-
tivities will be conducted by the focal firm, by partners, or through arm’s length 
transactions, as well as revenue and cost structures. It is important to note that a 
business model will include not just a description of the organization but also, crit-
ically, a description of its environment, including the broader (economic, social and 
political) institutional context, competitors, customers, consumers, suppliers and - 
especially relevant for our discussion – partners (Dahan et al. 2010).  
 
According to extant research, both the design of business models and the ability 
to constantly introduce innovations to the business model are key issues for any 
organization looking for better performance and higher value capture. In literature, 
this has been discussed under the name of business model innovation (BMI) (Amit 
and Zott 2012; Chesbrough 2010; Mitchell and Coles 2003). Accordingly, BMI is 
associated to the ability to create innovation and improvement processes at the firm 
level that can be used to build new value propositions or enter new markets and 
industries. Adding new firm activities, linking existing activities in new ways or 
changing their distribution inside the firm have been all discussed as relevant BMI 
processes (Massa and Tucci 2013).  
 
While most research has been concerned with business model innovation at the 
firm level, there is still little understanding of the challenges of first setting up, and 
further on innovating the business models of hybrid inter-organizational partner-
ships (Chesbrough and Scwartz 2007; Dahan et al. 2010). Studies suggest that a 
main factor to shape the developmental path of an alliance is partners’ ability to first 
assess and then react to discrepancies between initial and emergent conditions 
(Arino and de la Torre 1998; Eden and Huxham 2001; Le Ber and Branzei 2009; 
Majchrzak et al. 2015). It is interesting to point out that in many of the cases in 
which cross-sector partnerships are set up, there is no pre-established business 
model, such that in some cases partners use a business model of one of the partner-
ing firms that they gradually modify and adjust to reflect the logics and functioning 
of the entire partnership or, most commonly, they build a business model from 
scratch (Dahan et al. 2010). From such standpoint, creating a business model for a 
cross-sector partnership is a step-by-step, trial and error project which might have 
important consequences for the trajectory of the partnership and the dynamics be-
tween partners. From such standpoint, it is thus important to define a list of does 
and don’ts for those who are considering engaging in such projects, and outline 
critical points in the adoption and use of partnership business models (Bryson et al. 
2015). 
 
3. Context description 
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In this chapter, we draw on a multiple-year case study of a hybrid collaboration 
in Italy between one Municipality, one public University, three trade and industrial 
associations, one Chamber of Commerce, a Public Utility Company and a Regional 
European Development Office that came together with the broad goal of supporting 
innovation and knowledge exchange at the regional level. The E.U. Cohesion Policy 
has been supporting for many years cross-sector collaborations between govern-
ment, universities and the private sector to deliver innovation in E.U. regions (CEC 
2014), and Italian regions have been no exception to this trend. For instance, not 
only is strengthening research, technological development and innovation singled 
out in the E.U. Cohesion Policy for 2014-2020 as a leading way to generate “smart 
specialization” across European regions, but also highly prioritized by the long-term 
strategies of Italian local governments (Romano et al. 2014; Zerbinati and Souitaris 
2005).   
 
In line with the institutional context in which it was inserted, the partnership that 
we studied was founded in 2009 in support of open projects for local innovation. To 
this purpose, stakeholders signed an Innovation Agreement in which they commit-
ted to “join resources to obtain mutual benefits related to innovation and knowledge 
transfer” by putting together “an innovative local government”, “highly competitive 
industrial region” and “distinctive research competencies of the local University” 
(cfr.). Following the Agreement, a new organization was created – the Regional 
Innovation Office (RIO) which had the purpose to implement the partnership 
agenda. This implied identifying concrete market opportunities for shareholders’ 
innovation projects, managing innovation projects on behalf of the shareholders, 
and negotiating, throughout the process, their heterogeneous goals and interests.  
By studying the evolution of RIO from its foundation to the present date, we trace 
the evolution pattern of the partnership and identify a series of critical points which 
have determined partners to reconsider the initial business model of the partnership 
as to move towards more customized and at the same time enabling business mod-
els. 
 
4. Main findings 
 
The case study describes three stages in the evolution of RIO: the broker stage, 
the transition stage and the platform stage, emphasizing how the shortcomings of 
the first business model and the subsequent threat of partnership failure in the tran-
sition stage have led to the setup of the second model. The setup of the platform 
model will be here proposed as best practice for collaborations between (multi-
party, cross-sector) private institutions with highly diversified and heterogeneous 
interests, and a set of trade-offs with respect to the broker model will also be iden-
tified. 
 
4.1 – The broker model stage 
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4.1.1 Assumptions: In the first phase of the collaboration (2009-2014), RIO was 
designed as broker –as a boundary organization that was expected to collect, assem-
ble and enact the multiple interests of its shareholders. Since partners had collabo-
rated only occasionally and predominantly in dyads but never around long-term 
projects and never together in formalized partnerships, they had little knowledge of 
each other’s goals and interests, and even less understanding about how to intercon-
nect them. As a consequence, all participating institutions expressed the intention 
to create a broker that would mediate inter-organizational differences and contribute 
to the creation of a dense network of inter-organizational actors, resources and pro-
jects. Besides, since partners felt the pressure to act as a whole, they expected RIO 
to scout, manage and carry out projects on their behalf. At the end of this timespan, 
RIO traversed financial and legitimacy crises, mostly due to partners’ reluctance to 
make further investments. As time passed, RIO started being perceived as a third 
party, a boundary organization that no longer represented their interests. In particu-
lar, partners’ intention to delegate to RIO all aspects of managing the partnership, 
on the one hand, and their unwillingness to give up control, on the other hand, gen-
erated an environment full of contradictions, ambiguities, malfunctions and unex-
pected events. Figure 1 represents graphically the assumptions of the brokering 
model. 
 
Fig. 1. EIS ecosystem with brokering model 
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4.1.2 Shortcomings: Several factors concurred to the fact that, as time passed, RIO 
started to be perceived as a third party, a boundary agent that did not represent 
shareholders’ interests: 
 
1. Overflowing goals: Partners were animated by different goals that prolif-
erated in uncontrollable ways. 2Since these goals were manifold and highly 
specific, partners continued to pursue them individually or in dyads despite 
the partnership frame. As a consequence, RIO’s assignment remained ex-
cessively broad and generic. 
2. Split hierarchy: RIO was assigned the responsibility to coordinate com-
mon projects but not also the authority to do it. Each organization conti-
nued to run decision making processes internally. 
3. Double unaccountability: RIO was evaluated each year based on a generic 
mission of “innovation and technological transfer”, rather than on specific 
projects or on well-defined goals assigned to each project. This was moti-
vated by partners’ will to ensure that RIO had enough autonomy and flex-
ibility on the market, on the one hand, but also by their intention to avoid 
direct responsibility for joint projects. The double unaccountability loop 
had led, on the one hand, to partners’ perception that RIO was not gener-
ating value for their organizations and for the public domain in general, 
and, on the other hand, enhanced RIO’s belief in founders’ lack of interest 
and responsibility.  
4. Opportunistic behavior: Actors either did not delegate their projects to RIO 
or decided to opportunistically delegate those projects with scarce re-
sources or with limited internal support.  
5. Marginal assignments: Most of the projects that the partner organizations 
delegated to RIO were not concerned with their core activities but with 
marginal activities. These were either activities that partners felt comfort-
able sharing with outsiders because they were not strategic for their organ-
izations, either activities that did not count significantly towards the organ-
izational performances, or activities for which they did not have internal 
funding or support. 
                                                          
2 To give an example, the Municipality was concerned with urban development, 
social welfare and cultural initiatives, the University with obtaining new research 
funding, the Chamber of Commerce was interested in legitimating its choices for 
allocation of public funds, the Public Utility Company was concerned with a spe-
cific urban regeneration project, the European Office aimed at implementing a net-
work of science parks across the region, and the trade and industrial associations 
were animated by the need to defend the interests of the firms they represented, and 
their own interests as well (e.g., competition and collaboration with other industrial 
associations). 
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6. Limited entrepreneurial initiative: RIO only rarely manifested initiatives 
such as proposing new projects or creating new opportunities for its stake-
holders. RIO attributed the limited entrepreneurial initiative to the scarce 
resources and the limited institutional legitimation that partners invested 
them with.  
7. Decreasing investments: Shareholder’s financial investment in RIO was 
limited, and diminished each year. This was also reinforced by the percep-
tion that RIO was not generating value. 
8. Information gaps: RIO and its stakeholders had limited information about 
each other’s projects, initiatives, goals and activities. The communication 
system was deemed insufficient by all parties. It mostly ran through RIO’s 
informal relations and largely depended on RIO’s ability to use informal 
relations with each of the partnering organizations. However, the flow of 
projects, plans, objectives and expectations that each partner brought to the 
partnership was much more than RIO’s organizational structure could pro-
cess. 
 
4.2 –The transition stage 
 
The 2014-2015 timespan marked a critical stage of transition. In particular, after 
the implementation of the brokering model and the first dissatisfactions with the 
model, RIO traversed a period of financial and legitimacy crisis. The Municipality, 
the University and the Chamber of Commerce saw their institutional roles altered 
by national legislation changes. The difficulties faced by these organizations in 
committing to the collaboration project on the long term, together with the percep-
tion of RIO’s inability to generate value for each single partner, determined partners 
to inquire about whether maintaining or terminating the partnership. This caused a 
period of paralysis as far as decision making about existing projects, and launch of 
new projects is concerned. After a long and hurdled period of transition, partners 
decided to keep the partnership alive and to restructure RIO according to a new 
model that would reflect more closely their specific needs and interests. We identi-
fied several reasons that contributed to this decision: 
 
1. Pressures to avoid partnership failure: Manifold institutional pressures for 
legitimation and accountability prevented partners from declaring the fail-
ure of the partnership. Since stakeholders were inserted in a natural eco-
system in which they co-existed (i.e., the region), the failure of the part-
nership was perceived as a potential threat for the public domain -a “point 
of no return” in the evolution of the local community. As a consequence, 
partners were motivated to avoid breakpoints at all costs.  
2. Persistence of collaboration goals: Just as in 2009 when they had decided 
to found RIO, partners still had the pressing need to engage in innovative 
collaborations with other institutions as to generate more value for them-
selves and for the local community. Accordingly, during the transition 
phase the leaders of the partnering organizations had come to believe that 
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the complex activities of the partnership could have been only dealt with 
by persevering in the project of collaboration. 
3. Compulsion to complete the collaboration infrastructure. Despite rising 
conflicts, tensions and mistrust, partners evaluated they were halfway in 
the realization of a common structure to enable open innovation. As such, 
delegating the management of the partnership to a boundary organization 
such as RIO was still considered the best, if not the only possible solution. 
However, there was considerable confusion about how the project could 
have been restructured as to avoid the traps experienced in the first phase, 
and to overcome the paralysis that characterized the second phase. 
 
4.3 –The platform model stage 
 
4.3.1. Assumptions: All the organizations that had initially founded RIO decided to 
preserve the partnership and to restructure RIO according to a new model that would 
have reflected more closely their specific needs and interests. Starting with the sec-
ond half of 2015, partners engaged in a one-year consultation process aimed at re-
organizing the business model of RIO. This process reconsidered the relational and 
instrumental structure of the partnership, from goal setting and authority settle-
ments, to resource allocation and levels of commitment. The platform was designed, 
prototyped and is currently being experimented, as follows:  
 
1. Loosely coupling heterogeneous interests within a multi-layered platform 
RIO was transformed from a boundary organization that operated on the 
market with the mandate of its shareholders to a boundary-less organiza-
tion that coopted projects from a large number of local stakeholders. To 
this purpose, RIO encourages not only its shareholders, but also other  local 
shareholders interested in open innovation, to launch projects of interest 
and to lobby those projects to other organizations, in the attempt to obtain 
necessary resources to take the project further. 
2. Concentrating governance and widening participation: Partners decided 
to reduce the shareholders base in order to concentrate authority, responsi-
bility and decision making inside a circumscribed perimeter. Moreover, 
they redesigned the Board of Directors to give voice to the top management 
of the partnering organizations (Mayor, University Dean, Presidents of In-
dustrial Associations, President of Public Utility Company, President of 
European Regional Agency and President of RIO). This also contributed 
to the creation of an informal circle of decision makers in the ecosystem.  
 Whereas the shareholders’ base, the stakeholders base was widened in or-
der to attract as many resources as possible, to encourage diffusion of the 
partnerships’ initiatives, and to gain legitimacy in the local community.  
3. Disintermediating: Rather than delegating projects to RIO, the stakehold-
ers are encouraged to launch the projects themselves. A project must be 
launched by a triggering organization/institution that manifests a strong in-
terest in a project which requires collaboration with other organizations 
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and/or institutions (e.g., setting up a regional science park, creating a joint 
industry-academia PhD, designing a national database on technology 
transfer projects). With the help of RIO, the triggering actor identifies and 
mobilizes relevant partners. 
4. Abolishing generic missions: RIO’s old mission regarding generic activi-
ties of innovation and knowledge transfer was abolished. Instead, its action 
became the direct expression of stakeholders’ interests.  
5. Creating project units: Each project constitutes a separate organizational 
structure which is designed, managed and evaluated only by those organi-
zations that manifest a direct interest in its realization. These structures 
received the name of “innovation units”. Innovation units are characterized 
by juridical and financial autonomy -i.e., they constitute as separate organ-
izational units inside RIO, or even as separate firms within the firm. Their 
responsibilities include defining the purpose of the project, clarifying goals 
and sub-goals, budgeting the project activities, and composing project 
management teams.  
6. Managing a multi-layered platform: In the platform model, the main mis-
sion of RIO is the coordination of the platform. First, RIO is responsible 
for providing a set of basic services to the innovation units (physical space, 
administrative staff, communication, etc.). Second, RIO develops a service 
catalogue from which each innovation unit can choose the services of in-
terest (e.g., project management, legal support, public relations, funding 
proposal drafting, etc.). This allows to create a personalized offer accord-
ing to the contextualized needs of each unit. While for the basic services a 
fixed cost is imputed to RIO’s shareholders on an annual basis, for cata-
logue services costs are assigned to each innovation unit (thus to stake-
holders) by perceiving a service fee with variable percentages to be defined 
at the moment of creation of the innovation unit. Such services are deliv-
ered by RIO in collaboration with a pool of external collaborators -consult-
ing firms, professionals and freelancers, etc. Services that are not contem-
plated in the catalogue might also be offered to innovation unit,s provided 
the renegotiation of the annual fee.  
7. Mobilizing network externalities: In addition to managing the ecosystem 
of innovation units, RIO has the mission of creating synergies between in-
novation units, scouting for new resources, encouraging new entrances and 
anticipating exits, managing the overall portfolio of innovation units, and 
planning its short and long-term evolution. 
8. Building communication and reporting infrastructures. RIO also plays an 
active role in facilitating information flows inside, across and outside the 
innovation units. Each innovation unit communicates the evolution of the 
project to RIO management. In turn the latter documents the composition 
and evolution of the platform’s projects portfolio, reporting results to the 
BoD and to the Platform’s Scientific Committee. The latter is composed of 
scientists, influent managers and technology gurus that are responsible for 
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identifying general technological innovation trends in the market and stud-
ying their compatibility with the platform’s features and requirements.  
 
 
Figure 2 below represents graphically the assumptions of the platform model, as 
described in the eight points above.  
 
Fig. 2. EIS ecosystem with platform model.  
 
 
 
 
5. Discussion and implications for practice  
 
Although it has become almost commonplace to think about public and private 
organizations in open innovation systems, it has been less straightforward to think 
that such initiatives can assume various forms -especially when they imply collab-
oration with other organizations. It is also important to consider that such forms are 
highly dependent on the characteristics of the environments in which they develop, 
and that different partnership business models can lead to different partnership con-
figurations, and different partnership outcomes (see also Clodia Vurro et al. 2010).  
 
A paradox of cross-sector partnerships is that by which partnering organizations 
might designate brokers to accomplish innovation activities on their behalf rather 
than act as innovators themselves. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the EIS 
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ecosystem and shows their consequences when a broker model or a platform model 
are adopted. By comparing the brokering model with the platform model, it be-
comes visible that the latter was established to answer shortcomings experienced 
with the first. Specifically, setting up brokerage units to which organizations 
broadly delegate the responsibility of managing complex inter-organizational pro-
jects has become a common practice. The complexity of the partnership objectives, 
the uncertainty of its long-term outcomes and the difficulty of negotiating hetero-
geneous interests, among others, are some of the reasons why partnerships might 
opt for a brokering model.  
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the EIS ecosystem and consequences for the adoption of 
brokering and platform models 
 
 
Characteristics of EIS ecosystem 
 
 
Brokering model  
 
Platform model  
 
1. Heterogeneous goals 
 
Overflowing goals 
 
Loosely coupling hetero-
geneous interests within 
a platform 
 
2. Multiple individual governance systems 
and common governance systems run in par-
allel (e.g., RIO BoD) 
 
Split hierarchy Concentrating govern-
ance & widening partici-
pation  
 
Disintermediating  3. Responsibilities are dispersed in the net-
work 
 
Double unaccountability 
4. Collaboration goals and sub-goals are 
broadly defined and highly inclusive  
 
Opportunistic behavior 
related to generic mis-
sions 
 
Abolishing generic mis-
sions 
5. Priorities are assigned differently by net-
work organizations according to internal sys-
tems of relevance and modify over time 
 
Marginal assignments 
 
Defining project units 
6. Initiatives are born spontaneously and go 
extinct spontaneously, as actors interact in the 
ecosystem 
 
Limited entrepreneurial  
initiative 
 
Managing the multi-lay-
ered platform 
7. The growth of the ecosystem depends on 
the extent to which actors allocate and mobi-
lize resources across boundaries 
 
Decreasing investments 
 
 
Mobilizing network ex-
ternalities 
8. Information flows fast, asymmetrically, 
and unpredictably 
Lack of shared infor-
mation 
Creating communication 
and reporting infrastruc-
tures 
 
 
As summarized in Table 1 and described throughout the case study, the adoption 
of a brokering business model can generate a sort of ambidexterity in the partnership 
such that the partnering organizations (i.e., the partnership shareholders) remain fo-
cused on their core missions and, at the same time, create boundary organizations 
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that operate on their behalf in new fields of interests. We have exemplified some of 
the reasons why the brokering model has high likelihood of failure in cross-sector 
partnerships. This does not mean that the brokering model is destined to fail in any 
situation but that in the environmental conditions here described (see Table 1), only 
difficultly could have partners’ goodwill and best practices avoided the failure of 
the model. We do not imply that there are no examples of boundary organizations 
that use the brokering model successfully to deal with complex innovation projects. 
Instead, we suggest that although brokering organizations operate with success in 
different sectors of the private and public economy, the likelihood that these units 
reach the goals for which they were created decreases as the number and the heter-
ogeneity of the goals assigned to them increases (see Bryson et al 2006; Lunnan & 
Haugland 2008). Furthermore, the circumscribed nature of brokering models ren-
ders them less subject to exponential growth than platform models: While in the 
brokering model partners assigned to RIO a general mission of innovation and tech-
nological transfer which in turn RIO had to first articulate and then implement ac-
cording to its own understanding and competencies, in the platform model a higher 
number of actors played a more active role.  
 
What is interesting to notice is that even if both the platform model and broker-
ing model were designed to meet their interests, partnering organizations were  more 
willing to mobilize resources within innovation units than they were willing to as-
sign them to RIO during the brokering years. This is also connected to the risk that 
partners may reach a certain point in which they perceive the broker as a third party 
that is not the expression of their strategic vision, either as single organizations or 
as partnership. If allocating resources to RIO is perceived in the first case as a con-
tribution to a higher (and more generic) goal, in the latter it is seen as an investment 
in a strategic project for one’s organization. To give an example, in Italy, the bro-
kering model is mostly used by single organizations or by bipartite partnerships to 
setup complex projects with external stakeholders (e.g., Universities that setup in-
dependent organizations to deal with industry relations, Municipalities that create 
independent organizations to deal with local fundraising for public innovation, pri-
vate firms that create a task force for social innovation projects, etc.). These projects 
still represent a very small fraction of the total expenditure in research and devel-
opment of Italian public and private organizations, but they are on the rise, just as 
the hybrid multi-stakeholder project that we have presented in this study (see Mus-
cio 2010). Our findings suggest that while brokering organizations with few share-
holders can thrive by hyper-specializing in a set of goals that their shareholders have 
in common, this is not applicable to brokering organizations that are accountable 
for broad and potentially divergent goals pertaining to a high number of sharehold-
ers from different sectors. The risks that we emphasized in this case study are dis-
tributed across a continuum that goes from difficulties to negotiate heterogeneous 
goals, on the one hand, to the tendency to establish overarching goals that are broad 
enough to encompass shareholders’ divergent interests, on the one hand, but also 
ambiguous enough to be misrecognized by them, on the other hand (see overflowing 
goals).  
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Another important risk is the difficulty that brokering organizations encounter 
in maintaining both authority and responsibility on the goals assigned to them by 
shareholders (see split hierarchy and unaccountability), as well as maintaining 
shareholders’ commitment to financing their activities (see opportunistic behavior, 
marginal assignments and decreasing investments). In particular, we have shown 
that the difficulty to capture investments might determine brokering organizations 
to spend more time looking for shareholders’ financial support than reaching the 
objectives assigned to them. This, in turn, impacts negatively on their image, and 
on the perception that they can generate value for the shareholders and for the com-
munity of stakeholders at large.  
 
The platform model overcomes such problems because it gives space to public 
institutions, businesses and other social institutions to come together directly, with-
out intermediation. The Units of Innovation (UI) here described represent self-de-
termined groups that, by making use of the supportive functions of the platform, 
collaborate to carry forward projects of direct concern for shareholders. When a 
cross-sector partnership becomes organized like an open platform, the boundaries 
between shareholders and stakeholders (interested individuals, organizations or 
communities that are situated outside the partnership) become blurred. The UI can 
be thus seen as small businesses that plan, finance, implement, promote and monitor 
projects of direct concern but which have the particularity that their members rep-
resent both the innovation unit and the partnering organizations. Then what matters 
is that the parties that create an innovation unit maintain full control on goal setting, 
resource allocation and project implementation, regardless of their more or less sta-
ble affiliation with the partnership. Since the destiny of the UI depends directly on 
their efforts, they must act as entrepreneurs, actively looking for support for the 
innovation unit, rather than delegating to the broker. In other words, the previously 
mentioned paradox is resolved such that organizations no longer delegate broad ob-
jectives but work with other interested parties to select and make them come to life. 
Needless to say, this can also trigger some negative consequences, such as the in-
creasing complexity that involved parties confront with inside and outside the part-
nership, scarcity of competent resources, or tendency to stabilize some coalitions in 
order to lower the complexity of managing a highly diverse portfolio of innovation 
units. Another particularity of the platform business model is that by emphasizing 
the active roles of the partnering organization, the role of the brokering organization 
becomes one of technical support. While this may appear like a downgrade, it actu-
ally deals more realistically with what a small organization can do for a high number 
of partners which manifest little willingness to make large investments in joint pro-
jects of uncertain outcomes. As we have seen, precisely because of the uncertain 
outcomes that a collaboration with diverse stakeholders will bring for each of the 
involved parties, actors may feel entitled to push their own goals in the partnership 
agenda and show reluctance in delegating the control over partnership decisions 
(see also Austin and Seitanidi 2012). 
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It is important to notice that in addition to the abolishment of the generic mission 
and to disintermediation, another fundamental advantage provided by the platform 
model has to do with the capacity to mobilize network externalities. While in the 
broker model the brokering organization is responsible for finding resources and 
assembling them around specific shareholder interests, in the platform model the 
boundary organization has a mere support role, identifying synergies between pro-
jects and suggesting more efficient recombination across innovation units. Yet, as 
stressed earlier, it is the innovation unit that maintains at all times full responsibility 
for making the project grow –i.e., creating connections with other potential inter-
ested parties and promoting projects to the community at large. The brokering or-
ganization can offer a broad range of services in support of these activities but only 
if the members of the innovation unit have clearly indicated the nature and direction 
of their needs. From this standpoint, the boundary organization acts as a warranty 
for the rationalization of the activities hosted on the platform, creating communica-
tion and reporting infrastructures inside and across units of innovation. Most im-
portantly, the brokering organization in the platform model identifies synergies and 
establishes a strategic direction to ensure the growth of the platform over time, on 
the one hand, and the reinforcement of its identity, on the other.  
 
We would like to point out that the platform model is not without flaws and 
risks. First, the flow on the platform depends heavily on the strength of the entre-
preneurial interests of the partnering organizations. Second, it depends on their abil-
ity to attract the interests of other actors inside and outside the partnership as to 
create functioning and autonomous innovation units. In the absence of these condi-
tions, the network becomes less dense, and the ability to mobilize network external-
ities also becomes more modest. The network effect in the platform model is highly 
important because the main advantages of participating to an innovation platform 
derive not so much from the services provided by the boundary organization, but 
from the opportunities arising from complex networks of social and economic in-
terests (see Koschmann et al. 2010). Most importantly, innovation units are also 
difficult to manage because they entail actors with different backgrounds and par-
tially divergent objectives. The management of such units can provide significant 
challenges for partners and for members of the brokering organizations who are 
called to act as facilitators. Although this last aspect has received less attention both 
in research and in practice, it is particularly important to set up appropriate infra-
structures in support of the professionalization of boundary brokers, such as training 
offers, policy guidelines or access to existing best practices (Hundal 2014; Jupp 
2000; Warner 2003). 
 
Another key aspect for understanding business model innovation in cross-sector 
partnerships is the transition between business models. As the literature on business 
model innovation suggests, questioning the current business model, and going 
through trial and error processes to modify it, constitutes without doubt a trigger for 
change, on the one hand, but it also brings along potential negative consequences, 
such as higher levels of uncertainty, rising complexity and spirals of conflicts and 
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mistrust (Massa and Tucci 2013). If this is true for organizations, it can be even 
more so for cross-sector inter-organizational partnerships that entail high levels of 
uncertainty, complexity and conflictuality per se. Our case study testifies the thin 
line between questioning the actual business model, innovating it, and declaring the 
failure of the partnership. For instance, we have shown that in the transition stage, 
partners’ problems with the business model led them to experience a generalize state 
of paralysis in decision making and project management, which almost caused the 
dissolvement of the partnership. It was only thanks to the presence of some catalyz-
ing factors -i.e., pressures to avoid failure, persisting need to accomplish the goals 
that brought them in the partnership in the first place, compulsion to complete the 
initiated collaboration- that partners decided to keep looking for alternative solu-
tions. However, in cases in which these catalyzing factors are missing or are less 
impactful, partners might decide to throw in the towel rather than sustain the efforts 
and uncertainties entailed by a new business model.  The question that rises spon-
taneous is: Given the fragility of hybrid partnerships, especially in the beginning 
phases (Doz and Boburoglu 2000; Austin & Seitanidi 2012), is it worthy to try a 
business model innovation if there are signs that the model in place is not perform-
ing well, or is it more convenient to try to ensure partnership stability and wait for 
the consolidation of the current model? Evidence from the literature suggests that 
the ability to continuously adjust plays a very important aspect in the evolution of a 
partnership (Eden and Huxham 2001; Majchrzak et al. 2015). Future research might 
investigate when and whether small steps of business innovation can allow for 
swifter and less destabilizing translations (see also Sosna et al. 2010) 
 
Al in all, ecosystems that encompass the public and the private domain develop 
around fuzzy sets of relations between multiple organizations with heterogeneous 
goals and interests (Hartley et al. 2013; Selsky and Parker 2005; Waddell and 
Brown 1997). 2000). Although interest in the nature, evolution, and conceptualiza-
tion of hybrid partnerships has been remarkable, literature has shared a tendency to 
portray these forms of collaboration as win-win situations of which all stakeholders 
benefit (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Linder and Rosenau). Yet little is known about 
business model adopting in such settings, and the logics and mechanisms that allow 
actors to innovate their business models (Clodia Vurro et. 2010; Dahan et al. 2010). 
Two business models of hybrid partnerships have been discussed in this chapter, 
the brokering model and the platform model. While the platform model seems more 
appropriate for complex projects in which heterogeneous cross-sector interests co-
exist, both models present advantages and disadvantages. We have suggested that 
attention should be given to identifying, signaling and managing both advantages 
and disadvantages in a relational manner, by focusing on how the business model 
innovation will impact on each parameter of the current model and, at the same 
time, on how manageable the parameters of the new model are in terms of partner-
ship strategy, structure and mobilizable resources.  
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